says, “is not simply the Other to religion. It is a phenomenon in its own right that demands reflexive scholarship, critique and open-minded exploration” (p. 361). It is remarkable, let me add, that this obvious idea has had so little influence on the social-scientific study of religion so far. Studies of secularism and secularity are still relatively rare, perhaps because social scientists so often and for so long have taken them for granted as “normal,” and, therefore, uninteresting and unproblematic. Why this has been so can be explained by historical and sociological analysis of the formation and development of the scientific study of religion. This involves studies of the place of religion and research on religion in academe. One such study is Tomoko Masuzawa’s chapter on religion and the university. Masuzawa insightfully argues that church-state separation “has been instituted in an intricate relation to what might be called the regime of ‘church and school separation’” (p. 185) and that in this context academe has been deeply involved in the “production of the secular.”

The limits of this review do not allow me to comment even in brief on all of the 13 contributions to this volume. Together, they provide a wide array of perspectives on and thought-provoking approaches to the role and place of religion in contemporary society. This stimulating discussion could be reinforced if the volume incorporated more consistently some of the ideas that the contributors themselves find important. This refers, first, to the under-utilized potential of comparative research on desecularizing trends and forces and their interplay with secularity across nations and cultures. While the book emphasizes the importance of the opening of global horizons, its discussion of postsecularity is still mostly informed by Western empirical cases. If postsecularity is not only a normative and prescriptive, but also an empirically descriptive concept, then comparative research is indispensable for trying to detect varieties of the configurations of the postsecular. Yet, there appears to be a degree of disagreement among the authors as to whether or not the postsecular is an empirical notion. Indeed, as was mentioned above, the first chapter by Gorski, Kim, Torpey, and VanAntwerpen states that the idea of the postsecular in part reflects religion’s resurgence in the world. However, 10 chapters later Torpey references Casanova to suggest that the postsecular does not describe a stage in the relations of religion to secularity but rather is “the opposite of secularism understood as an intellectual-political project” (p. 287). This tension between the empirical-descriptive and normative-prescriptive interpretations of postsecularity is not unique to the volume. Existing literature gives multiple and often contradictory interpretations of the postsecular, which are of inconsistent empirical-descriptive relevance. Given this state of the literature, the volume would only gain from a more systematic inventory and appraisal of existing interpretations of its central concept, the postsecular. Overall, however, this book is an important, thoughtful, and stimulating contribution to theoretical and empirical analysis of the complex relationships between the religious and the secular in contemporary societies.

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Christianity has been growing fast in China in the last several decades. According to the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life’s well-reasoned and conservative estimate, China is among the top 10 countries with the largest number of Christians in the world today, and there are probably more Protestants in China than any other country except the United States. In addition to journalists who have been heralding the dawn of a new era since the
beginning of the new century, more and more academics have joined the orchestra. They commonly predict that China is likely to have the world’s largest Christian population in two or three decades.

But the heralding or orchestra of the rapid Christian growth is not musical to the Chinese Communist Party that has ruled China since 1949. To the contrary, the Chinese Communist Party has tightly held on to an atheist ideology and imposed strict restrictions on Christianity. In spite of the restrictive regulations, however, Christianity has been reviving and thriving under Communist rule. How is this possible? What are the social factors and social dynamics that have trumped the atheist ideology and restrictive policy?

*Constructing China’s Jerusalem* by Nanali Cao is one of the few empirical studies that try to shed light on this intriguing question. It focuses on Wenzhou, a coastal area in southeastern China that has been one of the economically booming centers and has been dubbed as “China’s Jerusalem” because of its high concentration of Christians. According to Cao, “China researchers have focused on the post-Mao revival of religion as a politically and ideologically charged process in which the local community resists the totalizing party-state” (p. 5). Cao rejects this “binary construct of state domination and church resistance” and sets out to “examine embodied systems of beliefs and processes of meaning making in daily life” (p. 8). He shows that, instead of resistance to the party-state, Wenzhou Christians have adopted the official discourses of modernization and economic development. In fact, they have partnered with the party-state in the development project and pioneered in the “socialist market economy.” Meanwhile, without being confrontational, Wenzhou Christians have revamped the state atheist modernity for an alternative modernity based on Christianity. Many Christian entrepreneurs have been church leaders and preachers who have converted economic capital, social knowledge, and civic skills for the purposes of church management and evangelistic outreach. “They actively and creatively seek to integrate their religious and entrepreneur identities, thereby depoliticizing Christianity in the state-authorized context of business development” and maneuvering to bring Christianity to the mainstream of society (p. 41).

For example, when the party-state agencies in direct charge of religious affairs set obstacles for evangelistic activities, Wenzhou Christian entrepreneurs would weld their economic capital with their political capital and personal connections and approach higher party-state authorities or agencies that held a keen interest in economic development. Being more powerful than the agencies of religious affairs, such agencies were more likely to grant permission for religious activities that might bring economic benefits for the place under their jurisdiction. Also, when the party-state clearly forbid the formation of Christian organizations outside the state-sanctioned church, Christian entrepreneurs organized forums and revival meetings without adopting a formal organizational name.

Such an approach would not achieve the formal legalization of their Christian practices, though they are not exactly illegal. It is this gray market of religious activities, as I would call it, that the Wenzhou entrepreneurial Christians have been able to engage and enlarge. Consequently, they have led the Christian revivals in Wenzhou and beyond. Meanwhile, the cosmopolitan modernity that is based on Christianity and promoted by successful entrepreneurs is widely attractive to locals and migrant workers from other parts of the country.

The book contains three core chapters addressing the main theme: one describes the rise of “boss Christians” and their engagement with state power, one explains Wenzhou Christians’ cosmopolitan desires and the remaking of their modern Christian identity, and one examines the “Wenzhou model” that intertwines business growth and Christian revivals. In addition, there is a chapter on gendered agency and gender hierarchy and another chapter on rural migrant workers’ participation in Wenzhou Christianity.

With thick descriptions of Wenzhou Christianity, Cao makes an important contribution to the understanding of the Christian growth in China. It is a welcome addition to the small and slowly growing literature on the social scientific study of Christianity in China.
However, I am not persuaded by his claim that the simplistic church-state confrontation has been the dominant model in the scholarly research on Christianity in China. Many sociological studies have drawn on fieldwork and interview data to make more sophisticated arguments about church-state dynamics in China. He is too quick to dismiss the "sociological macro structural approach" (p. 11) without accounting for the range of empirical evidence and theoretical arguments in existing sociological studies. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, everyone interested in Christianity in China should read this interesting book.

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In recent decades, American political conservatives consistently have offered policy proposals grounded in arguments about individual responsibility, market solutions, and limited government. For academic critics, such arguments are characteristic of a more or less unified ideology called "neoliberalism." Tracing the intellectual history of neoliberalism from classical liberalism through its reinterpretation by Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and Ayn Rand is easy. But accounting for the relative prominence of neoliberalism in a world of political alternatives is not so easy. Why has neoliberalism captured the American conservative imagination?

In Faith Based, geographer Jason Hackworth provides a simple answer. It hasn’t—at least not by itself. The basic premise of the book is that the success of neoliberalism in American politics depends on its alignment with other powerful political ideas. Hackworth argues that American conservative politics are characterized by "religious neoliberalism," an ideational fusion that sanctifies neoliberal arguments with religious justifications offered by evangelical Protestants. In Hackworth’s view, religious neoliberalism advances the agenda of neoliberalism in American politics by linking it to the political power of the Religious Right, while also unifying disparate elements of American evangelicalism in common political purpose.

The key argument of the book is that there is an ideational link between neoliberal thought and evangelical Protestantism in particular. Faith Based makes this case by showing how some evangelical Protestant justifications for social welfare policy in America productively align with neoliberalism. For example, one could justify caring for the poor and needy as fellow children of God, but one could also justify limiting such care as interference with God’s punishment of people for their sins. To demonstrate the connections underlying religious neoliberalism, Hackworth offers illustrative examples of the logic of neoliberalism in Dominion theology, Christian libertarianism, and prosperity theology. He also identifies, through systematic analysis of social welfare discussion in Christianity Today and official publications of the National Association of Evangelicals, a consistent "compassionate neoliberalism" in evangelical discourse that criticizes government welfare solutions while emphasizing the importance of private religious alternatives.

Yet Hackworth also argues that the ideas in religious neoliberalism are unsupported by reality. As his analysis of newspaper coverage of Habitat for Humanity reveals, the idea of private provision as a preferred substitute for government provision of welfare has become “common sense” in public discourse. But, as he discovers in surveys and interviews, existing organizations are incapable of realistically fulfilling neoliberal dreams of private welfare provision. Habitat for Humanity may build nicer homes than the government does, but it can never build enough of them. In fact, as he argues in a short but powerful chapter comparing rescue missions in New York City, Phoenix, and Nashville, replacing government with private providers would aggravate existing geographic inequalities in social welfare provision.

Given this basic disconnection between ideas and reality, what is the future of