

REPORT FROM THE AD HOC PANEL TO EVALUATE SECURITY FEEDBACK

Report on Feedback Collected after the
Tragic Shooting of January 21, 2014



Submitted to President Mitch Daniels
April 28, 2014

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- VIII. Appendix I, "Cost Breakdowns and Strategies to Complete a Survey of Doors on the West Lafayette Campus."
- IX. Appendix II, "Purdue Alert Activation Data"

I. PANEL MEMBERS

Stuart Bolton, Professor of Mechanical Engineering and University Senate representative

Mike Cline, Vice President for Physical Facilities

Arnaud B. Couturieux, School of Languages and Cultures, Graduate Student Representative

John Cox, Chief of Police

Eric Dietz, Professor of Computer and Information Technology

Barb Frazee, Executive Director of University Residences

Julie Griffith, Vice President for Public Affairs

Patricia Hart, Professor of Spanish, * **Panel Chair**

Meg Highley, College of Health and Human Sciences, Student Representative

Jim Hintz, Associate Dean of Students

Mark Kebert, Risk Manager

Beth Kozik, Assistant Dean of Students, Crisis Management

Mary Duarte Millsaps, Operations Manager, Office of the Vice President for Research

Kevin Ply, Fire Chief

Kathleen Prechtel, Parent Representative

David Shaw, Chief Information Security Officer

Carol Shelby, Senior Director of Environmental Health and Public Safety

Steve Schultz, Legal Counsel

II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

After the tragic shooting that took the life of Andrew Boldt on the Purdue West Lafayette campus on January 21, 2014, Purdue Chief Financial Officer Al Díaz and Provost Tim Sands convened a panel and charged them with evaluating and analyzing the feedback received through multiple methods of communication to the University. The panel was asked to do the following:

1. Organize the messages and information received into categories
2. Select from each category the most important suggestions
3. Add key suggestions that may be missing, based on the expertise in each sub-committee
4. Respond in a general way to suggestions that were discarded, explaining why
5. Return a succinct summary for possible implementation

The entire group met together once at the beginning and once at the end of the process. In the interim, they broke down into sub-committees that met on their own and produced reports that were then examined and commented upon by the group as a whole.

In the process of reviewing and gathering information in response to the feedback received, the ad hoc panel confirmed the existence of practices and procedures that are generally well-designed to enable Purdue respond to crises and emergencies. To the extent this event revealed a weakness, it was in the lack of awareness of the procedures in certain cases, thus revealing a general need for more communication and training about Purdue's crisis response protocols. Consistent with Purdue's culture of continuous improvement, the panel has identified a number of areas in which possible process enhancements could be made to the University's emergency training, preparedness, alert, and response mechanisms. Those observations and recommendations are identified in this report. Perhaps due to the particular circumstances of this terrible crime, none of the comments reviewed by the panel suggested a measure to intercept a targeted one-on-one attack of this nature.

The ad hoc panel was not tasked with implementing the observations and recommendations made in this report. However, in certain cases, the discussion of them reflects an understanding that a future group (the "Implementation Panel") may be formed for the purpose of evaluating them and developing a plan for their further implementation.

III. SUB-COMMITTEES

Physical Facilities:

J. Stuart Bolton
Gary Carter
Mike Cline
Kevin Ply

Notification and Communication:

John Cox
Eric Dietz
Julie Griffith
Jim Hintz
Mark Kebert
Mary Millsaps
David Shaw

Mental Health and Privacy Issues:

Barb Frazee
Jim Hintz
Beth Kozik
Kathleen Prechtel
Steve Schultz

Education, Training, and Preparedness:

Gary Carter
John Cox
Arnaud Couturieux
Eric Dietz
Barb Frazee
Mark Kebert
Beth Kozik

First Responders:

John Cox
Kevin Ply
Carol Shelby

IV. SUB-COMMITTEE RESPONSES

a. Physical Facilities

Doors and locks: One of the most frequently-received responses was that not all doors on campus can be locked from the inside without a key. A number of people who sent emails, called, wrote letters, or spoke in person felt very strongly that the ability to lock themselves inside a classroom or lab would make them safer. Some expressed anger that this was not possible during the January event.

The Physical Facilities sub-committee was asked by the panel chair to address the issue of locking doors. All of what follows should be considered in the context of the whole panel's recommendation that the administration work with an outside expert to develop a documented, tiered plan to refine our policies, 'SOPs' (standard operating procedures), and safety-security technologies, including door lock hardware. The following ideas were also put forth with the understanding that additional work will need to be done to formally develop a strategy, deployment schedule, and an estimate of the cost.

Below are two pertinent reports:

i. Practical Considerations about Doors and Locks

This submitted by the Vice President of Physical Facilities from Operations and Maintenance.

1. There are approximately 41,204 doors on the West Lafayette campus, based on information obtained from SMAS
2. Many of these doors would need to be converted to have "lockable" hardware.
3. It would cost approximately \$500 per door to convert to lockable hardware.
4. Adding panic hardware to doors in lecture halls and large occupancy classroom could cost between \$1200 and \$1500 per exit door
5. A preliminary review of the Electrical Engineering Building determined that 173 out of 411 doors would require new hardware.
6. An estimated \$50,000 would be needed to upgrade Electrical Engineering.
7. Lockable doors could require a standardized key for classrooms.
8. Keys would need to be issued to every individual in a teaching role. This would include graduate and undergraduate teaching assistants, as well as adjunct faculty hired on an ad-hoc basis to teach individual classes.
9. In order to know how many doors need to be converted and the type of existing door hardware, an investigative survey of all doors would need to be completed.

10. The investigative survey would cost an estimated \$50,000 using current employees or hiring temporary student workers to verify door hardware and record findings.
11. The investigative survey could be completed during the 12 week summer period.
12. The university is bound by fire and building codes that are adopted as state law in Indiana.

ii. Indiana Fire & Building Codes and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Requirements

This was submitted by the Purdue Fire Department.

1. Fire and building codes are adopted as state law in Indiana.
2. Buildings can be “grandfathered” to meet the codes that are in place at the time the building is constructed. A renovation project could require the renovated area to be brought up to current codes (2012 edition).
3. The average age of Purdue buildings is 50 years.
4. We also need to be ADA compliant for individuals with disabilities. This has a direct impact on the function of the door hardware, especially for egress.
5. Room occupancy is based on usable square footage.
6. Rooms with a total capacity of less than 50 persons will typically have a single access door which opens inward.
7. Rooms with a total capacity of greater than 50 persons will typically have doors which open outward toward the corridor. A room of this size will most likely have more than one door to enter and exit.
8. Many of our doors, especially the ones which open into the corridor, have glass panels which can be broken to easily defeat the locking device.
9. There can be no more than one locking device per door. The code exempts hotels/motels, which can have chain locks for added security.
10. For accessibility, locked doors need to be able to open with a closed fist. No turning of a thumb latch, twisting of a wrist or grasping of a handle is acceptable. This eliminates the traditional round doorknob.
11. The flat lever type door hardware is the most commonly used for door egress.
12. Deadbolts and locks can be used but they must automatically release when the interior door handle is actuated.
13. No keys or thumb latches can be used to unlock exit doors.
14. A door cannot be locked in a manner that keeps individuals from exiting in an emergency. This is not only a fire code issue, but we also have to remember that legally, you cannot confine people against their will.
15. Panic hardware can be used, but only in doors that open outward into the exit corridor. Panic hardware will not work on rooms or offices where the exit door opens inward.

16. One concern is what happens when an individual with the intent to do harm has the ability to enter a room and lock the door behind him/her. Would this delay providing assistance to the occupants of the room? While the occupants might be able to get out, needed help might not be able to get in.
17. The wide variety of types of doors and locking mechanisms has to do not only with the age of the facilities, but also the use. What works for a standard classroom may not work for a lab or office space. Many of our facilities are mixed occupancies and could require several different options to meet the code requirements. This would require a review of each individual occupied space to best determine what can and cannot be done.

iii. Observations:

1. There is currently no central database with information about all of the doors on campus. If the Implementation Panel decided that this should be done, it has been estimated that such a survey would cost around \$35,000 to collect the information and another \$6,500 to enter the data (based on having the labor carried out by students during the summer).
2. The detailed information about such a survey is included in Appendix I, "Cost Breakdowns and Strategies to Complete a Survey of Doors on the West Lafayette Campus."

iv. Reactions by Full Panel:

1. Not all building safety plans were consistent with the current thinking that exterior doors to most buildings should not be locked in the case of active shooters, tornadoes, or other hazards where the sirens sound to tell people to go indoors. Locking doors in these situations means that people outside who need shelter cannot get it.
2. Each building needs to examine a fully-updated plan and make sure that the building deputy and others know what to do. In the January 21 event, confusion was caused about whether buildings should be locked and who should be responsible. In fact, most buildings should not be locked when there is an all-hazards siren. All people at all levels should be aware of the parts of the safety plans that affect them.
3. Because of the great concern that was brought forward about the inability to lock certain classrooms, we recommend that the administration work with an outside expert to develop a documented, tiered plan to refine our policies, 'SOPs' (standard operating procedures), and safety-security technologies, including door lock hardware. All these ideas are put forth with the understanding that additional work will need to be done to formally develop a strategy, deployment schedule, and cost.
4. Eventually, an overall picture of general use classroom door locks should be constructed.

5. The full panel also felt that it would be worthwhile to get a picture of how many ITaP labs have doors that do not lock from the inside. The pros and cons of any changes should be discussed.
6. We think that the Implementation Panel could consider the desirability of carrying out the door information survey outlined in Appendix I, “Cost Breakdowns and Strategies to Complete a Survey of Doors on the West Lafayette Campus.”

b. Notification and Communication

This sub-committee made a series of suggestions for improvement, opportunities to leverage existing resources, and other training, education, and preparedness considerations.

i. Possibilities to expand our usage of the RAVE Alert capabilities:

1. Make our text system “opt out” rather than “opt in,” as it is today—meaning that we would sign everyone with a Purdue career account up for text messaging unless they choose to be removed. This would greatly increase our coverage of new and continuing students, faculty and staff.
2. Enable one “easy” button with a number of alert layers, including text, email, social media, Purdue Home Page, and Boiler TV. ITaP is exploring the programming/tech changes needed to integrate all of these to the RAVE tool. This would enable all messages to deploy at once, regardless of the platform.
3. Enable our electronic screens across campus to carry a “flash” message or “crawler” (they look like big TVs, but are actually large computer monitors). This would be a new capability.
4. Utilize our new Alertus partner to provide the capability to send a message to all computers that are on, providing a full-screen message or crawler until the user clears it. This would require that software be added to each computer. The group even discussed making the software available to personal computers/laptops that faculty might use in the classroom. Anyone on PAL or hardwired would receive the messages on their desktops.
5. Install Alertus “beacon” devices in classrooms that are large or have limited PAL or cell coverage. This is a 4”x6” device that would be installed on the wall and would light up and post the same text message being delivered over other systems.

ii. Key Considerations Related to Purdue’s Cleared Contractor Responsibilities:

1. Campus safety leaders should be alerted by the Facility Security Officer (FSO) when an area starts to house classified material. They should also be alerted when the area is no longer being used for that purpose. (There is currently

none on campus, but this could change as new projects come on line). Information should include:

- a. Layout of affected area, roster of cleared personnel working with or with access to the material in that area
 - b. Unclassified description of the type of material stored and the containers used for storage.
2. As a “Cleared Contractor” subject to the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM; also referred to sometimes as DoD 5220.22-M), Purdue needs to develop procedures for safeguarding classified material in emergency situations.
 3. In the event of an emergency situation that affects any of our cleared personnel or renders Purdue incapable of safeguarding classified material, the FSO must report that to our Cognizant Security Agency (Department of Defense, Defense Security Service).

iii. Other Training, Education, and Preparedness Considerations:

1. Training (delivery policy)
 - a. Initial training and sustainment training needed
 - b. Mandatory and on line (like Institutional Review Boards [IRB] or the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act [FERPA])
 - c. Exercise to ensure all know what they should
2. Education (provide background to take into life)
 - a. What groups need trained and for what
 - b. Training for leadership
 - c. Police
 - (i) Identification
 - (ii) Perimeter Control
 - d. Shelter in place vs. evacuate
3. Preparedness (policy)
 - a. Planning needed to ensure all tasks are clear
 - (i) Administrative
 - (ii) Campus Leaders
 - (iii) Staff
 - (iv) Students
 - (v) Parents?
 - (vi) Campus Guests?
 - b. Actions before next event – exercises to ensure training effective
 - c. Leverage safety week in September
 - d. Sirens and other equipment
 - e. Hearing-impaired individuals
 - f. Disabled individuals
 - g. All clear process questioned

4. The training provided to teaching assistants (both graduate and undergraduate) should be reviewed to ensure they are appropriately prepared should they find themselves in a classroom leadership situation at the time of a crisis situation.
5. The level at which crisis management must be considered in contemporary society has accelerated the need for response and outreach. We are investigating and have had outstanding internal response to partnering with an outsourced Call Center vendor that could offer crisis management support, professional counseling, work-life and other behavioral health services to our students, faculty, staff and parents. The complexities of activating an internal call center (shelter in place may prevent that from happening) would leave us vulnerable to not communicating well enough, quickly enough or professionally enough. A peer reviewed call center vendor would provide myriad resources and supplement the responses Purdue University staff could activate and manage. FEI is being reviewed as the preferred vendor and could be held on an annual retainer and paid for services based upon level of need.

c. Mental Health and Privacy Issues

i. Summary of Comments Reviewed

1. The mental-health related comments reviewed by this sub-committee covered a variety of topics, including concerns for follow-up care for students who were impacted by the event, concerns about how to create a sense of security and well-being after tragic events such as this, and inquiries about what support services are available to students and how to refer students to those resources.
2. As we considered and discussed these comments, the sub-committee reached a general consensus that they could be grouped thematically into two broad categories in terms of areas of potential process improvement:
 - a. Ensuring the **availability** of mental health resources at Purdue's West Lafayette campus, and
 - b. Improving the state of **awareness** of those resources. The latter category focused in particular on ways to enhance Purdue's stakeholder communications and marketing materials in order to ensure there is a broad awareness of:
 - (i) Resources and
 - (ii) Appropriate steps to take to make them available to those in need (whether that is on a proactive or preventative basis or in the immediate aftermath of a crisis).

As a result, the communications/marketing enhancements can be seen as a linkage between the two themes of 'availability' and 'awareness.' The observations below are grouped according to these themes.

ii. Availability of Resources

The sub-committee discussed the programs and outreach efforts outlined below, many of which were already in place or in the process of implementation prior to the events of January 21, 2014. We believe all of these ideas are worthy of further exploration and/or implementation to achieve the desired process improvement benefits.

1. Office of the Dean of Students

a. Expanded Outreach Efforts and Programs

(i) *Psychological First Aid Training.* Staff in the Office of the Dean of Students will be collaborating with staff from Counseling and Psychological Services and Purdue University Student Health, as well as other campus departments, to become certified trainers of psychological first aid. Psychological first aid provides people without former mental health education with the concepts and skills to assess the needs and concerns of people in distress who have been recently exposed to a serious crisis and provide them with practical care and support in ways that respect their dignity, culture and abilities. Psychological first aid is a fundamental aspect of applied crisis intervention and disaster mental health. Once trained, staff members will be able to provide training sessions to Purdue University community members. The estimated implementation for campus wide training is fall 2014.

(ii) *Train the Trainer Programs,* such as "Question, Persuade, Refer (QPR): A Suicide Prevention Program." QPR is an evidence-based gatekeeper training program that is designed to reduce suicidal behaviors by providing innovative, practical, and concise training in a 1-hour prevention workshop. This program will teach members of the Purdue University community the warning signs for suicide and depression, allowing for fast and appropriate referral for students at-risk staff. Twelve staff members from areas within the Office of the Dean of Students have been trained as Certified QPR Gatekeeper Instructors. Beginning May 2014, these staff members will be available to co-facilitate QPR Gatekeeper training for groups across The

University community. These trainings will be strongly marketed to student organizations, staff, and faculty members.

- (iii) *New Parent and Family Programs Office within ODOS.* The Office of the Dean of Students has recently hired a new director of this office. This new position will serve parents and family members of our students by being a central point of contact at the University, increasing communication between the University and parents and family members, forming a partnership with parents and family members in supporting their student's success, and coordinating opportunities for parents and family members to engage in the campus community. The addition of a centralized Parent and Family Program will fill a gap in service and allow us to leverage the positive influence of the parents and family members of our students.
 - b. *Outreach for students who have suffered a loss or trauma.* A common practice for the Office of the Dean of Students is the efforts by staff to coordinate care for students who have experienced a trauma or loss. All students identified as being on scene or near a trauma or a traumatic scene or who know the victim or the alleged students involved, are outreached to and offered support services within 24 hours of the incident. A list of students is organized and shared with "need to know" staff and department heads that can coordinate care and outreach efforts and follow-up with students as needed.
 - c. *Office of the Dean of Students website.* The sub-committee suggested increasing the awareness of the "student of concern" link that is accessible through the Office of the Dean of Students webpage and linking it to other Purdue webpages. This form allows anyone to report student they have concerns about and will be triaged and managed in the appropriate department(s).
2. *Graduate Student Ombudsman.* This person, who is focused on graduate student assistance, provides consultation and referral services to other resources available to graduate students. The ODOS Student Assistance Center serves this same function for undergraduates. Consideration should be given to whether there may be ways to establish even closer coordination between ODOS and the Graduate Student Ombudsman, such as in connection with providing training for graduate teaching assistants (see iii.7 below).

3. *Employee Assistance Program.* This program is available to Purdue employees and offers confidential and professional on-site counseling and referral services to eligible employees on a wide range of issues. In the case of the event of January 21st, for example, ODOS reached out to faculty members who were directly impacted to make sure they were aware of available support and referred for counseling through EAP resources. Consideration should be given to developing a standardized process for “caring for the caregiver” to prevent and treat vicarious trauma in the aftermath of a traumatic event. ODOS generally has the overflow resources necessary to address these additional responsibilities from both a funding and personnel perspective, but documenting a brief set of protocols designed to make sure those in positions of responsibility are themselves cared for should be considered. ODOS could be charged with maintaining and administering these protocols as and when they are needed. On a related note, to the extent individuals who are directly impacted by such an event are “Cleared Contractors” having access to classified material under NISPOM requirements, there should be a heightened awareness of the need to deploy the employee assistance protocols referenced above to aid those individuals. When doing so, appropriate personnel from ODOS should stay in close contact with the Facility Security Officer to ensure the necessary follow up is given.

4. *Possibility of Mutual Aid Agreement.* Although Purdue is equipped with strong mental health resources of the type described above, consideration should be given to engaging with other colleges and universities around the state to explore whether there is common interest in entering into a “mutual aid agreement” for mental health resources, such as counseling in the aftermath of a catastrophic event or emergency. This type of agreement allows agencies to provide assistance to each other across institutional or jurisdictional boundaries at the request of a sister agency in need. For example, if the magnitude of an event were to cause the counseling and other mental health resources in the immediate aftermath of a crisis to be overwhelmed, the contracting institutions would stand ready to make their own mental health support resources available to those in need on Purdue’s campus. The sub-committee believes this idea, which was raised in the context of the Panel’s general meeting, has merit and should be given consideration.

iii. Awareness (Stakeholder Communications and Marketing Enhancement).

The sub-committee also discussed the communications and information access enhancements discussed below, some of which were already in place or in the process of implementation prior to the events of January 21, 2014. Like the resources discussed above, we similarly believe all of these ideas are worthy of

further exploration and/or implementation to achieve the desired process improvement benefits.

1. *Boiler Gold Rush-Expanded Marketing Efforts Regarding Support Services.* Boiler Gold Rush (BGR) is a “new student” orientation program offered through the area of Student Success. Beginning this year Boiler Gold Rush will address ten first-year orientation topics in 50 minute classroom settings. The classes will be offered through each college. One of the topics to be addressed is “Campus Safety and Health and Wellness”. The sub-committee suggests that as part of the curriculum of this class, new students will be educated about support services available to them both on and off campus.
2. *Increased Information Flow Through Parent Committee.* The sub-committee also discussed the idea of increasing information about relevant campus and community events, news and safety guidelines to the Parent Committee. The suggestion is that with increased information coming to the attention of the committee, this could be disseminated more quickly to parents and families, thus increasing the already existing communication efforts and methods. (For example, currently a newsletter goes out to parents and families four times per calendar year; this frequency could be increased or added to as needed.)
3. *Improvements to Parent Website.* The sub-committee suggested improvements for the Purdue Parent website including the addition of a question and answer page of commonly asked question by parents or relatives; an explanation of FERPA (Family Education and Right to Privacy Act), HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) and other applicable federal laws as well as parents’ rights; a guide for parents to learn more about how to advise their student in conflict resolution as well as steps a parent can take to find support for their son or daughter at Purdue University.
4. *Improvements in On-Line Permissions for Access to Student Data.* The Office of the Dean of Students is partnering with other on-campus departments to consider the implementation of an online Release of Information/Consent Form for all offices within Purdue, so that parents and families can more easily access information about their student.
5. *New Features for ‘Parent Track’ Component of Student Orientation.* Beginning in the summer of 2014, staff in the Office of the Dean of Students and the Purdue University Police Department will collaborate with other campus partners to providing educational workshops for parents going through the Summer Transition Advising and Registration (STAR) days. These workshops will focus on campus safety and emergency preparedness.

6. *Assessment and revision of the current policies and practices of the Purdue University Behavior Intervention Team (BIT).* The BIT is a multidisciplinary team of representatives from the Purdue community focused on prevention and early intervention for any students who have raised concerns and may be at risk of harming either themselves or others, or who pose a significant disruption to the living, learning or work environment. The mission of the BIT is to promote the safety and well-being of the Purdue University community. The team receives and reviews reports of threats and other concerning student behavior for the purpose of developing a support plan that mitigates risk within existing University Policy. The BIT is currently in the process of reviewing and revising its existing protocols and practices in light of applicable legal requirements and other considerations. As it conducts this review, the BIT will, for example, explore important issues in the BIT referral process. Upon completion of this review, the BIT practices and procedures will be updated on the Purdue's website along with a list of the core team members.
7. *Training for Faculty, Advisors, and Teaching Assistants.* Once the revisions to the BIT process have been finalized, ODOS staff members will educate the Purdue University West Lafayette campus as to the functions of the team and how to refer a student of concern as a part of educational outreach programming. Currently faculty and staff from the academic and advising community are ad-hoc members of the BIT. Leaders in these communities will be identified and encouraged to invest in the mission of this team. They will also be asked to assist in a collaborative effort to educate faculty and staff in their departments, as well as other members of the campus community, on the functions of the BIT and how to make referrals to the BIT.

d. First Responders

By far the most common response to the tragedy was to thank the first responders and the entire safety team for the successful handling of the event. Of the emails received, 177 of them expressed thanks and support. There were almost five times as many emails with this message as those regarding the next two concerns (questions about “shelter in place” and “lockdown protocol”).

i. Successful Initiatives from the Office of Environmental Health and Public Safety (EHPS) That Will Continue:

1. The committee found that the partnerships that Purdue University Police Department (PUPD) and Purdue University Fire Department (PUFD) have built with local emergency responders were invaluable in this tragic situation. In fact, a West Lafayette Police Department (WLPD) officer was the first to arrive on the scene, and this enabled the suspect to pass quickly into PUPD

custody. These relationships and the activities that lead to them will continue.

2. Inter-agency emergency response training will continue—in the form of tabletop discussions and a variety of “boots on the ground” exercises. These exercises provide the right training to prepare our partners for on campus and near campus emergency response.
3. Public Safety Offices at Purdue will continue to ensure the interoperability of radio communications that allowed multi-agency teams to form quickly to clear buildings and secure the crime scene.
4. First responders have exercised or practiced active shooter plans, including with a US Dept of Education grant in 2009. This has been sustained and should continue to be exercised to ready the entire campus growing from first responders to help ready the rest of us to help support response.

ii. Initiatives Carried Out Immediately

Following the events of January 21, the Office of Environmental Health and Public Safety implemented the following improvements to communications.

1. A Twitter feed was established (@purdueemergency) that will provide quick information to those who are not able to sign up for the Purdue Alert, such as on-campus vendors, including day care employees, printing services employees, and construction contractors.
 - a. This will push the Purdue Alert messages
 - b. This will provide information specific to an emergency on a more frequent basis (currently planned to be every 15-30 minutes while the emergency is underway).
2. The Office of Environmental Health and Public Safety worked with the Digital Marketing staff to enhance the purdue.edu/emergency website to provide information more quickly during the emergency.
3. The EHPS met with their contacts at Information Technology at Purdue (ITaP), AT&T and Rave Wireless Alert to determine possibilities for enhanced communication

V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION

- a. Incorporate additional integration (moving toward an “easy” button concept to send multiple media
- b. Integrate a new tool, Alertus Beacon, to be installed in either large classrooms and/or classrooms and labs with poor cell and wireless connections. This echoes the recommendations made by the Sub-committee on Notification and Communication above.

VI. RESPONSE TO AN EMAILED CONCERN

One person pointed out that there was a Purdue Police plainclothes officer who lacked clear identification from all sides.

- a. All PUPD officers carry a “Department of Transportation (DOT) green” vest in their vehicles, in compliance with DOT regulations for working in or near roadways.
- b. It is the practice for officers to don these vests when they step out of their vehicles.
 1. In this case, one officer failed to do so.
 2. The solution is to provide periodic reminders to all officers (both uniformed and non-uniformed) to reinforce this requirement.

Several people asked about why Citybus continued to drop off people. It is the PUPD’s practice to call Citybus when there is an emergency. PUPD has also encouraged Citybus officials to sign up for the twitter text to be sure they are among the first to know of any emergencies.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

a. Actions already taken

1. The panel commends rapid actions of the EHPS, ITaP, the Vice President for Public Affairs office, and other groups that made some quick safety enhancements. Outstanding among these are:
 - a. The establishment of the twitter feed (@purdueemergency)
 - b. In one instance, staggered scheduling was immediately implemented to enhance speedy communication.
 - c. An arrangement with a call center to handle a high volume of calls in case of an emergency.
2. In certain cases during the event, professors did not apparently understand or respect the information about the shooting and did not stop teaching or take other appropriate action. The administration took effective measures after the event to emphasize to faculty the importance of following safety instructions in the event of an emergency.

b. Recommendations for further action:

1. Communications and Education

We strongly recommend that the university develop a safety-training test that functions like the FERPA test, so that the individuals’ Purdue accounts

will stop working if the training is not updated periodically. A beta test format is already in existence, developed by Professor Eric Dietz.

This would reinforce answers to a number of the simple questions that came up with clear answers:

- The “all hazards” siren means “seek shelter inside.”
- A fire alarm means “exit the building.”

We cannot emphasize strongly enough how important it is for faculty to respect these warnings and follow the instructions.

We do **not** recommend employing several different siren sounds, as we believe it would be confusing, and that the most important message to convey is that an all-hazards siren means “seek shelter.” Further instructions can come by text and email alerts.

We believe that the matter of when to use drills and what kind should be decided on by EHPS, who will determine which types of drills should be employed in individual contexts.

All faculty, students and staff are strongly urged to sign up for the text alerts. A few complained that too many texts were sent about matters that did not interest them. In reply, we would observe the following:

- Only 19 total texts were sent in all of 2013.
- It is not possible to tailor texts only to people who are in close physical proximity to a given event. Every text sent was of significant concern to people who were in the area of an event.
- It is possible to turn off those texts selectively on all smartphones and tablets.
- Some pointed out that professors and students generally have their phones turned off during class. It was suggested that in a large class, a professor could assign one student in the front of the room to leave the phone turned on in case of messages.

Please see Appendix II, “Purdue ALERT Activation Data” for more information about the number and type of alerts that were sent.

We suggest that the new twitter account (@purdueemergency), in addition to being useful for all stakeholders on campus, would be a good way for parents and others to get constant, up-to-date information.

We believe the addition of Alertus beacons in large classrooms and rooms with poor wi-fi or cell service would be a very effective tool. Because of the

bright light and the message screen, this is also an effective method for alerting the hearing impaired. The fact that this was recommended by several sub-committees gives extra weight to the suggestion.

All faculty, students, and staff are urged to download the Purdue apps on any smartphone or tablets they might have, and take a look at them. They are responsive, and have clearly visible, one-touch buttons that take you to a list of safety definitions and instructions

All faculty, students, and staff are urged to take a look at the Purdue web page and watch the safety videos. All Deans and Department Heads are strongly urged to figure out ways to get the faculty to comply. Note that this page can also be accessed directly if you search the web for “Purdue safety” or “Purdue emergency.”

All of these suggestions and others can be delivered and reinforced by periodic mandatory safety certification.

We recommend that the plan to work with a call center be finalized.

2. Technology

We believe that the university should expand its agreements with RAVE Wireless to install Alertus beacon devices in all large classrooms and in areas such as basement classrooms where there is poor wi-fi, PAL, or cell phone reception. We think that the beacons in large classrooms would be a priority, but that a tiered plan should be outlined that would gradually expand the presence of the beacons in other places according to priority, and with a close eye to improvements and innovations by our partners at RAVE Wireless. In general, we believe that the administration might want to err on the side of generosity in the purchase of the beacons.

We recommend the adoption and implementation of a “one-button” system of delivering text alerts, emails etc.

We believe that the appropriate way to get information to parents and other off-campus stakeholders is to direct them to the Twitter feed and website.

3. Infrastructure

We suggest that the university work with an outside expert to develop a tiered plan to refine our safety policies, “SOPs” (standard operating procedures), and safety-security technologies, including door lock hardware.

A common misconception among respondents was the notion of “lockdown,” which is a term generally used in K-12 schools or facilities such as jails. The West Lafayette campus could more practically be considered as a small city, and you cannot lock down a city. There are no walls or fences around Purdue. In a K-12 school, during normal hours, people are inside a few buildings, where at Purdue, during a normal day, people are continually moving between buildings all across campus, and entering and leaving campus. Purdue has around 39,000 students, 8,000 staff members, and 4,000 faculty members. Workers, delivery people, contractors, visitors and others leave and enter. The population is larger than that of Kokomo, Valparaiso, or Elkhart, for example. The West Lafayette campus consists of 372 buildings—161 major buildings, and 211 others. It is neither practical nor desirable to try to “lock down” Purdue. Rather, people need to know to take shelter inside a building quickly when an all-hazards alarm sounds. That is why most building outside doors should not be locked. All building deputies should be aware of the plan for their buildings.

That being said, we suggest that the university proceed briskly with investigating the installation of doors that lock from the inside in the large classrooms. A tiered plan could continue to look at mid-sized classrooms, if this is what the outside experts recommend, and if doing so does not create additional hazards that we have not contemplated.

If it can be done safely, we think that a goal of providing locking hardware on Purdue West Lafayette general use classroom should be given serious consideration.

All faculty offices lock, and faculty spend a good amount of time in their own office, but students are constantly on the go between buildings and in classrooms, so we think it is important for them to be able to move inside a building quickly during an all-hazards situation. We think that ideally, it would be increase students’ feeling of safety and wellbeing if classroom doors can be locked in case of emergencies.

The administration should work with the College of Engineering to discuss appropriate repurposing of the classroom where the murder took place.

All new buildings that feature large classrooms, such as the planned Active Learning Center, should be designed and built with classroom security in mind.

4. Mental Health and Privacy

Purdue must continue to ensure the availability of mental health resources at Purdue’s West Lafayette campus and work to ensure a high state of awareness of those resources.

We recommend that the Implementation Panel consider all of the suggestions made above under Section IV.c (Mental Health and Privacy Issues), including the measures that are already in the process of being implemented by the Office of the Dean of Students.

We encourage fresh efforts to foster wide awareness of what mental health resources exist for all personnel—students, staff and faculty—on the West Lafayette campus. Promoting a culture of sensitivity to mental health needs contributes to the safety and well-being of everyone on campus.

We recommend that the Implementation Panel follow up with ODOS to review the changes to the Behavioral Intervention Team process and assess the outreach efforts being made to educate the West Lafayette community on the functions of that team and the process for making referrals to it.

5. Education, Training and Preparedness

We recommend that the Implementation Panel emphasize a strategy of continued and reinforced outreach to teach all stakeholders what is available.

We recommend repetition of training. Deans must work with Department Heads to impress strongly upon the faculty their safety responsibilities, including, but not limited to:

- Making sure that pertinent safety information is included in the course syllabus and posted to Blackboard Learn
- Going through the material the first day of class
- Following the instructions strictly in case of any emergency. Any infraction should be dealt with seriously. Faculty must take all alarms and sirens seriously, and must place safety above a desire to cover a certain amount of material on a given day. Of course that is important, but safety takes precedence. All faculty, teaching assistants, lecturers, and instructors need to embrace the knowledge that in exchange for the privilege of teaching at Purdue, they must follow all safety procedures.

The University Senate and student leadership should meet to agree on guidelines as to how and when professors should stop teaching in the case of an emergency.

Deans and Department Heads have a role to ensure employees are informed and safe. These administrators could develop “recall” or notification trees for all employees to give one more assurance that everyone know about emergency notices and directions.

Deans should pay special attention to the orientation of students, teachers, and campus leaders for whom English is not the first language.

Another suggestion made was that something on safety could be worked into one of the large courses required for most freshmen.

IN CLOSING

We would like to conclude by commending the entire Purdue safety team for a careful handling of this tragedy, and the administration for its sensitivity in canceling classes, working with student leadership to facilitate the candlelight vigil, providing counseling, and instructing faculty and teaching staff on how to approach the matter in class.

VIII. Appendix I. “Cost Breakdowns and Strategies to Complete a Survey of Doors on the West Lafayette Campus”

IX. Appendix II, “Purdue Alert Activation Data”