Tim’s environmental economics research focuses on the design of incentive mechanisms to improve the efficiency of regulation. Recent applications include evaluating proposed rules for greenhouse gas emissions trading, and designing auctions for land use change to reduce nonpoint source pollution. He studies these research topics using a laboratory research methodology, in which human subjects interact in controlled, simplified markets so that the relationship between market rules and market performance can be carefully measured.

Selected Publications

"An Experimental Study of Compliance and Leverage in Auditing and Regulatory Enforcement" (with Lata Gangadharan), Economic Inquiry 44 (2006), pp. 352-366. Read Abstract or Download Paper

"Emissions Variability in Tradable Permit Markets with Imperfect Enforcement and Banking" (with Lata Gangadharan), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 61 (2006), pp. 199-216. Read Abstract or Download Paper

"A Laboratory Comparison of Uniform and Discriminative Price Auctions for Reducing Non-Point Source Pollution" (with Lata Gangadharan), Land Economics 81 (2005), pp. 51-70. Read Abstract or Download Paper

"Buyer Liability and Voluntary Inspections in International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading: A Laboratory Study," Environmental and Resource Economics 25 (2003), pp. 101-127. Read Abstract or Download Paper

"An Experimental Investigation of the Seller Incentives in EPA's Emission Trading Auction," American Economic Review 85 (1995), pp. 905-922. Download Paper